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I. INTRODUCTION
The proposed Free Trade Agreement' between Mexico and the
* B.B.A., Texas A & I University; M.A. in Economics, Notre Dame University; J.D.,
Thurgood Marshall School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School; former law professor,
University of San Diego School of Law and the Notre Dame Law School; professor of
international business law and economics, University of Texas at San Antonio.
1. Presidents Bush and Salinas agreed on June 10, 1990, to begin comprehensive prepa-
rations which will eventually lead to the negotiation of a U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agree-
ment (FTA). They defined an FTA as follows: a process of gradual and comprehensive elim-
ination of trade barriers between the United States and Mexico, including: (1) the full-
phased elimination of import tariffs; (2) the elimination or fullest possible reduction of non-
tariff trade barriers, such as import quotas, licenses, and technical barriers to trade; (3) the
establishment of clear, binding protection for intellectual property rights; (4) fair and expe-
ditious dispute settlement procedures; and (5) other means to improve and expand the flow
of goods, services, and investment between the United States and Mexico. See Kal Wagen-
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United States presents complex issues in both national and inter-
national settings. Any examination of these issues requires a com-
prehensive understanding of the recent trade policies which have
been promulgated by the Government of Mexico. These policies
have radically altered the environment for international trade
within Mexico and will shape the formation of any free trade
agreement between the two countries. Hence, a proper analysis of
the Free Trade Agreement must have, at its heart, a grasp of the
precedents that will serve as a framework for a free trade agree-
ment. Among the various developments in Mexico's' trade policy
which will be surveyed to gain this deeper understanding will be:
Mexico's Foreign Trade Law,2 Mexico's accession to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' U.S.-Mexico Frame-
work Agreement,4 the new regulations governing foreign invest-
ment in Mexico, 5 as well as the recent "fast-track" authority that
Congress gave to President Bush.' This Article will briefly outline
these policy changes and discuss their impact on a possible Free
Trade Agreement. Preceding this discussion, a quick look at the
history of Mexican trade policy, and specifically Mexican-U.S.
trade, is included in order to fully understand the dramatic evolu-
tion of Mexican trade policy.
II. MEXICO'S PAST TRADE PRIORITIES
During most of the twentieth century the Government of Mex-
ico has pursued a policy of import substitution, which strongly re-
stricted foreign goods from being imported and, consequently, lim-
ited the access of Mexican exports to foreign markets.7 Aimed at
protecting vulnerable Mexican industries from foreign competition,
these policies included various forms of tariffs, subsidies, import
licenses, quotas, and local content restrictions.8 These political de-
heim, Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Is Moving Closer to Reality, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
1990, at B7; see also The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
2. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 37-65 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 80-109 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 110-147.
7. Guy C. Smith, The United States-Mexico Framework Agreement: Implications for
Bilateral Trade, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 655, 661 (1989). See also Ernesto Rubio del
Cueto, Countervailing Duties Affecting United States-Mexican Trade, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L.
323, 333-334 (1990).
8. See del Cueto, supra note 7, at 325.
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cisions, which valued rapid industrialization over the potential
benefits of foreign trade and competition, did in fact achieve their
goal of contributing to the development of a Mexican manufactur-
ing base.9 Throughout most of the post-World War II period, Mex-
ico's considerable array of import controls made it one of the most
protectionist nations in Latin America.10 Understandably, Mexico's
historical resistance to international trade had also been linked to
its desire to avoid direct and substantial U.S. influence over its
economy."
While the protectionist policies of the Mexican Government
achieved their initial objective of establishing a manufacturing
base, these policies were not without their shortfalls.12 Protected
from foreign competition, many Mexican industries lacked the in-
centive to modernize and thus were unable to challenge the indus-
trial prowess of the developed (and many of the developing) na-
tions."3 Completely dependent upon domestic demand, Mexican
industry eventually faltered as the country continued to pursue its
protectionist policies. Eventually, the tremendous decline in world
oil prices in the early 1980s and Mexico's spiraling foreign debt,
14
prompted the Government to abandon its protectionist policies
and to examine avenues to usher in foreign trade.15 Guided by the
belief that foreign trade was essential to future economic growth,
Mexico attempted to liberalize its trade policy by opening up mar-
kets and promoting exports.1 6 The proximity and size of the U.S.
9. Smith, supra note 7, at 661.
10. Id. at 660-62.
11. Alejandro Ogarrio & Leonel Pereznieto Castro, Mexico-United States Relations:
Economic Integration and Foreign Investment, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 223, 226 (1990).
12. See SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
MEXICAN TRADE POLICY AND THE NORTH AMmCAN COMMUNITY 7-9 (Significant Issues Se-
ries) Vol. X, No. 14, 1988. See also Smith, supra note 7, at 661-62.
13. For example, the automotive industry is still heavily protected. This is primarily
due to the extensive investments made by major car and truck manufacturers, such as Gen-
eral Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Nissan, and Volkswagen. Although imports are still restricted,
the Decree for the Promotion and Modernization of the Automotive Industry, issued late in
1989, allows for importation of automobiles. See Decreto para el Fomento y Modernizacion
de la Industria Automotriz, D.O., Dec. 11, 1989.
14. See Charles W. Thurston, Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, 386 J. OF COM. 5
(1990).
15. See Ignacio G6mez-Palacio, The New Regulations on Foreign Investment in Mex-
ico: A Difficult Task, 12 Hous. J. INrr'L L. 253, 255 (1990) ("President Salinas extended the
liberalization policies first begun by President de la Madrid, further dismantling the system
of import licensing and tariff barriers that had characterized Mexican trade policies since
the 1930s").
16. See Eduardo Siqueiros, Legal Framework for the Sale of Goods in Mexico, 12
1991]
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consumer market made it the obvious nation with whom Mexico
should establish a foreign trade relationship.
III. PRIOR MEXICAN TRADE
Of all Mexican trade agreements initially negotiated, none was
as economically promising as the trade relationship with the U.S.
Despite the historical indifference which had characterized trade
relations between the two nations, 17 the U.S.-Mexican relationship
was dramatically altered by 1982. A series of bilateral trade agree-
ments and laws diminished many of Mexico's trade barriers.18 For
instance, the U.S. and Mexico signed the U.S.-Mexican Under-
standing on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in 1985.19 While
its focus was narrow, the agreement established the groundwork
for Mexico's expansion into the international arena.
By 1987, Mexico had imports valued at $12.2 billion.2 0 In 1988,
this figure grew to $18.9 billion, and by 1989, the figure escalated
to over $35 billion, of which $24.7 billion were imports from the
U.S. alone. 1 Total United States-Mexico trade for 1989 surpassed
$52 billion.22 With such a large volume of imports, it is no surprise
Hous. J. OF INT'L L. 291, 292-94 (1990).
17. See Ogarrio and Castro, supra note 11, at 226. Until 1982, Mexico had maintained a
steadfast policy of inward development, which was finally relinquished due to a drastic eco-
nomic crisis. Id. This crisis caused a 50% decrease in the standard of living throughout
Mexico. Id.
18. See generally Foreign Trade Law, infra note 26; Reglamento contra pr~cticas
desleales de Comercio Internacional [Regulations Against Unfair Trade Practices], D.O.,
Nov. 25, 1986, amended by Decreto por el cual se reforma y adiciona el reglamento contra
pricticas desleales de comercio internacional, D.O., May 19, 1988 ; Decreto de promulgaci6n
del Acuerdo relativo a la Aplicaci6n del Articulo VI del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles
Aduaneros y Comercio [The Antidumping Code of 1979], D.O., Apr. 21, 1988 (executed on
July 24, 1989); Decreto de promulgaci6n del Acuerdo sobre Procedimientos para el Trimite
de Licencias de Importaci6n [The Code on Import Licenses of 1979], D.O., Apr. 21, 1988
(executed on July 24, 1979); Decreto de promulgaci6n del Acuerdo relativo a la Aplicaci6n
del Articulo VI del Acuerdo General sobre Aranceles Aduaneros y Comercio [Code on Cus-
toms Valuations of 1979], D.O., Apr. 25, 1988. In addition, a decree reforming the General
Import Tariff, issued in April 1986, diminished trade barriers by modifying tariffs and low-
ering duties. See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Mexico [hereinafter
Working Party Report], para. 16, GATT Doc. L/6010 (July 15, 1986) in BASIC INSTRUMENTS
D SELCTE DocuMENTs [hereinafter BISD] 33d Supp. 57, 62 (1987). See also Richard D.
English, The Mexican Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 23 Tax.
INTr'L L.J. 339, 367-68 (1988).
19. See U.S.-Mexican Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, 2 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 590 (Apr. 24, 1985). See also Thurston, supra note 14, at 5.




that Mexico has become the United States' third largest trading
partner, trailing only Canada and Japan. 3 Additionally, en-
couraged by the rapid increases in foreign trade, direct investment
between the two countries has also grown significantly.
24
Grave social, diplomatic, and geo-political concerns have also
served to expand trade relations between the U.S. and Mexico.
The sizable amount of migrating labor from Mexico to the United
States, the cooperative war against drugs, and foreign policy con-
cerns are just some of the many motives which drive the Mexican-
U.S. trade alliance.2 5 While many of the non-economic interests
will not be explicitly discussed, it is not without an awareness of
these additional agendas that an analysis of recent legal develop-
ments will be offered.
IV. MEXICO'S CONSTITUTIONAL FOREIGN TRADE LAWS
Two basic legal instruments protect Mexico's business com-
munity and its marketplace from unfair international trading:
Mexico's Foreign Trade Law2 ' and the regulations implementing
the Foreign Trade Law. Implemen~ted in 1986, the Foreign Trade
Law constitutes the legislative basis for all foreign trade policies
and programs.2 8 Empowering the Executive Branch with a variety
of exclusive powers to control foreign commerce, the Foreign Trade
Law also promotes domestic industrial stability.2 9 In this regard,
23. Id.
24. David B. Hodgins, Comment, Mexico's 1989 Foreign Investment Regulations: A
Significant Step Forward, But Is It Enough?, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 361, 365 (1990). However,
although foreign investment activity has increased, foreign investment into Mexico has de-
clined in recent years. Id.
25. See generally Peter F. Drucker, Mexico's Ugly Duckling - the Maquiladora, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 4, 1990, at 20.
26. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 131 de la Constituci6n Politics de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos en Materia de Comercio Exterior, D.O., Jan. 13, 1986 [hereinafter For-
eign Trade Law].
27. Regulations Against Unfair Trade Practices, supra note 18.
28. del Cueto, supra note 7, at 325. The Foreign Trade Law regulates and interprets
Article 131 of the Mexican Constitution. Id.
29. Id. Under Article 131:
Congress may empower the Executive Branch to raise, lower or eliminate export
or import duties established by Congress itself as well as to fix new ones, restrict
and forbid imports, exports and the transit of articles, when considered neces-
sary so as to regulate foreign trade, control the country's economy, maintain do-
mestic productions; stability or for any other purpose with the country's best
interest in mind. The Executive Branch will subject its use of said powers to
Congress' approval when submitting its fiscal budget each year.
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the law mandates that certain criterion be met to consider an im-
port acceptable. According to del Cueto, the law's criterion chiefly
includes:
1. where domestically-produced merchandise is identical or sim-
ilar to that which is being imported under unfair conditions, the
domestic manufacturers have the exclusive right to defend
themselves from unfair practice;30
2. plaintiffs must represent at least a twenty-five percent share
of domestic production;3'
3. the procedural time limits are very brief;
2
4. the Commerce Department analyzes the decisions and partic-
ipates in the conciliation process, which can ultimately lead to
settlement proceedings."
The law specifies a variety of prohibitions against unfair prac-
tices"4 and grants the Commerce Department primary jurisdiction
over trade disputes. 5 While the wide latitude provided to the Ex-
ecutive Branch still exemplifies Mexico's protectionist sentiment,
these procedures have yet to be tested since no case has arisen re-
quiring its application.
This brief summary of the most recently enacted Trade Law
furnishes some insight into the foundation of trade policy-making
in Mexico. Although the internal political basis for trade law pro-
mulgation is well known, the specific legal developments in Mexi-
can-U.S. trade have not yet come full bloom. Yet, notwithstanding
their lack of legal development, the trade laws and subsequent reg-
ulations have paved the way to a U.S.-Mexican Free Trade
Agreement.
V. MExICo's ACCESSION TO GATT
Mexico has historically eschewed international trade in favor
Id. quoting CONsTrruCl6N POLIrlcA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIWOS MEXICANOS, 1917 art. 131 (1981).
For a Spanish copy of the Mexican Constitution see Mioun AcosTA & GENARO DAVID
G6NGORA PIMENTEL, CONSrrUCION PoLmcx DE LOS EsTrmos UNmos MmucANos (1984).
30. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 26, art. 10.
31. Id.
32. Id. at art. 11. There is a period of five working days, upon acceptance of a claim, to
issue the provisional decisions. See also del Cueto, supra note 7, at 327 n. 23.
33. See Foreign Trade Law, supra note 26, art. 12; del Cueto, supra note 7, at 327.
34. del Cueto, supra note 7, 326.
35. Foreign Trade Law, supra note 26, art. 2.
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of developing a domestic industrial base."e Hence, it is not surpris-
ing that Mexico initially refused to join the GATT."7 In order to
understand why Mexico has made dramatic efforts to reverse this
history, ultimately attempting to become a major player in inter-
national trade, some background on GATT is appropriate.
Established by the developed nations of Western Europe and
the United States at the end of World War II, GATT provides a
comprehensive framework for global trade. While the GATT has
undergone continual change since its creation, 8 its central tenets
have remained unchanged. Initially, all members of GATT must
give reciprocal Most-Favored-Nations (MFN) status to each
other's products.39 Second, the nations bound by GATT must not
employ levies or regulations more strict than those on similar do-
mestic products.40 Third, GATT requires the elimination of all
non-tariff barriers to foreign goods."' That is, the use of certain
barriers such as quotas and other artificial prohibitions must not
be utilized by the member-states. Fourth, custom duties must not
exceed the level stipulated in the last agreement.42 Finally, all
members of GATT agree to both restrict the use of subsidies43 and
prohibit dumping.4 Simply put, the governments agree not to arti-
ficially lower the cost of domestic goods through direct or indirect
revenue inputs, nor will they prohibit the sale of goods in foreign
markets at a price lower than cost."' Though numerous exceptions
exist to each of these lengthy regulations, the five tenets stated
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See also Dale Story, Trade Politics in
the Third World: A Case Study of the Mexican GATT Decision, 36 INT'L ORG. 767, 768-70
(1982). For a discussion of Mexico's reasons for remaining outside GATT for thirty-nine
years, see HOWARD F. CLIN, THE UNITED STATES AND MExico 390-91 (rev. ed. 1963); POLITI-
CAL SYSTEMS OF LATIN AMERICA 29 (Martin Needler ed. 1964).
37. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter GATT]. In fact, at
the time the developed countries were creating the GATT system in 1947, Mexico was creat-
ing a system of import controls. See Story, supra note 36, at 771. Mexico was not among the
twenty-three nations that were the original contracting parties to the Protocol of Accession
to GATT. See English, supra note 18, at 366.
38. Philip H. Gold, Comment, Legal Problems in Expanding the Scope of GATT to
Include Trade in Services, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 281, 285 (1982-83).
39. GATT, supra note 37, art. I, para. 1. MFN status simply accords recipient nations'
goods the most liberal trade treatment. See English, supra note 18, at 342-43.
40. GATT, supra note 37, art. III, para. 2.
41. Id. art. XI.
42. Id. art. II, para. 1(b).
43. Id. art. XVI, paras. 3, 4.
44. Id. art VI, para. 5.
45. See English, supra note 18, at 341-42.
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above comprise the essential components of GATT.
Many of GATT's rules and regulations have changed due to
ongoing negotiations between the member states. With a more
than fourfold increase in membership," such change is unavoida-
ble. The gathering of ninety-five different countries, each with its
own agenda, inevitably leads to disputes; consequently, a frame-
work to resolve these disputes is imperative.47 Accordingly, GATT
remains the exclusive means of governing international trade by
effectively limiting the practice of unfair trading.
Given Mexico's decision to enter the international trade arena,
it is not overly surprising that Mexico would attempt to pursue
membership into GATT. However, Mexico's traditional antipathy
towards the foreign hegemony it saw occurring through GATT did
make this decision unexpected. By 1986, Mexico was the largest
non-Communist market economy operating outside the auspices of
GATT. 8
In November of 1985, the Mexican Secretary of Trade and In-
dustrial Development, Hector Hernandez Cervantes, announced
Mexico's desire to accede to GATT.4 Upon receiving this notifica-
tion, the members of GATT conducted a thorough analysis of
Mexican foreign trade and investment law and concluded that
Mexico should be admitted into the GATT.e° In August of 1986,
Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 1
Mexico's accession to the GATT is governed by an important
set of principles which will substantially affect its trading relation-
ship with the United States and the promulgation of any free trade
agreement between the two countries. Similar to its earlier agree-
ments with the United States, Mexico was admitted into GATT
under the status of an advanced developing nation.52 Despite this
46. While there were only twenty-three original members to the GATT, there are now
more than ninety-five members. English, supra note 18, at 366.
47. Id.
48. See Mexico to Become 92nd Member of GATT as Government Pledges to Open
Market, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 187 (Aug. 4, 1986).
49. See English, supra note 18, at 369 (citing Accession of Mexico, GATT Doc. L/5919
(Nov. 27, 1985) (copy on file with the Texas International Law Journal); see also Stephen P.
Jacobs, Mexico's Accession to GATT Will Benefit U.S. Business and the World Trading
System, Bus. AM., Oct. 13, 1986, at 95.
50. See Working Party Report, supra note 18, paras. 3, 84.
51. Accession of Mexico, GATT Doc. L/6024 (July 17, 1986), BISD, 23d Supp. 56
(1987). Mexico became the ninety-second contracting party to the GATT. See English,
supra note 17, at 369.
52. Advanced developing countries have four characteristics: (1) increased development
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status, however, Mexico's transition to a free-trade nation will be
difficult because of the protectionist laws and policies which has
been in place for decades."8 Indeed, the regulatory framework of
the GATT forces Mexico to rework the very model of economic
development it has pursued. 5'
Mexico had to make numerous concessions to join GATT. Ini-
tially, Mexico offered substantial across-the-board reductions on
tariffs." For example, Mexico announced that it had unilaterally
implemented a maximum tariff of fifty percent." In addition, Mex-
ico declared that it would implement greater tariff reductions in
most non-vital industries.5 7 However, these barriers would be lim-
ited, and tariffs would be utilized instead of the less favorable im-
port permits. 8 In the majority of industries, Mexico would reduce
tariffs to between zero and ten percent over a thirty-month pe-
riod.59 By initiating these concessions, Mexico aimed to limit the
level of negotiated concessions that it might otherwise have to
make to individual GATT members. Mexico hoped that these re-
ductions would serve as a substitute for more demanding conces-
sions. These unilateral concessions, however are not binding and
nothing prevents Mexico from re-enacting many of these higher
tariff rates in the future.60 Similarly, nothing prevents Mexico from
using various levies and surcharges on bound or unbound items as
long as its net level is below the level specified in the GATT
policy. 1
A wide variety of government-owned enterprises, government
procurement, and government subsidization exists in Mexico.2
resulting from rapid growth; (2) complex and diverse industrial sectors; (3) ability to affect
the economies of industrial nations; and (4) productive development strategies, which in-
clude movement towards a more internationally oriented approach. See Story, supra note
36, at 772, citing JOHN A. MATHIESON, THE ADVANCED DEVELOPING CouNTRIEs: EmERGING
AcTORs IN THE ECONOMY 5-6 (1979).
53. See Luis Rubio, Mexico's in Perspective: An Essay on Mexico's Economic Reform
and the Political Consequences, 12 Hous. J. INT'L L. 235, 235 (1990).
54. See Jacobs, supra note 49, at 9. See also Accession of Mexico, supra note 49.
55. Working Party Report, supra note 18, para. 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. Protected goods include automobiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, paper, fire-
arms, few luxury goods, and to a lesser extent computers. See Siqueiros, supra note 16, at
293.
58. English, supra note 18, at 373.
59. Working Party Report, supra note 18, para. 6.
60. English, supra note 18, at 374.
61. Id. at 375.
62. These governmental services include the postal service, railways, electricity genera-
1991]
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This level of direct governmental involvement in the Mexican
economy will have profound implications for a trade pact between
the U.S. and Mexico. Mexican businessmen see government pro-
curement contracts as a vehicle for the Mexican government to as-
sist and subsidize their businesses. Allowing Americans to compete
with Mexican businesses on these contracts threatens a substantial
source of income for these businesses. Although the GATT system
fails to deal in-depth with the trade barriers that exist in govern-
ment-run operations, these barriers create a constant risk for po-
tential trade disputes and will surely be a focal point in negotia-
tions with the U.S. over a free trade agreement. In addition,
although the existence of government procurement is not expressly
prohibited, it too stands as a potentially sensitive issue in future
bilateral trade negotiations.
Accession into GATT has obvious and profound implications
for the future of a Mexico-U.S. free trade agreement. First of all,
Mexico's access to global markets heightens its competitive posi-
tion vis-h-vis the United States and hence makes such an agree-
ment all the more desirable for Mexico. Additionally, the commit-
ment demonstrated by Mexico to free trade in its accession
negotiations' s helps further convince the United States of Mexico's
reliability and resolve in earnestly pursuing open and fair trade.
Likewise, the proliferation of foreign firms within Mexico, which
will occur as a result of Mexico's accession into the GATT, makes
the conclusion of a free trade agreement more desirable for the
United States. Many of the bilateral agreements upon which the
two nations have agreed were only possible through GATT.64 In-
deed, the 1987 Understanding on Trade and Investment was
signed soon after Mexico's accession to GATT and the consultative
means outlined within the GATT framework were utilized in form-
ing that Understanding. Hence, Mexico's accession into GATT can
accurately be viewed as a true basis for improved bilateral trade
relations between the U.S. and Mexico.
tion, medical, education, and social assistance services. The oil refining and basic pe-
trochemical industries are totally owned by the government. Id. at 386.
63. See Working Party Report, supra note 18, at para. 4.
64. See English, supra note 18, at 363 n. 178. The codes illustrate the type of agree-
ment Mexico conceded at the Tokyo Round in 1979. These agreements are implemented in
Mexico. The continuous implementation of these agreements made it easy for Mexico to
begin the road to the FTA with the U.S. since many of the Tokyo Round agreements are the
same agreements being negotiated between the U.S. and Mexico.
[Vol. 23:1142
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VI. THE 1987 UNDERSTANDING ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT
The conclusion of the Understanding on Trade and Invest-
ment,6" also known as the United States-Mexico Framework
Agreement, serves as perhaps the greatest implication for success
of any U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement.
In April, 1985, United States Trade Representative William
Brock and Mexican Secretary of Commerce Hector Hernandez
signed a preliminary statement acknowledging their intent to nego-
tiate a bilateral trade agreement.6 After a series of meetings 7 be-
tween representatives from both countries, the Framework Agree-
ment was signed in November of 1987.65 This agreement
symbolizes the first formal bilateral agreement to govern commer-
cial relations between the two countries; additionally, it is the most
comprehensive pact entered into by the respective nations because
it creates a nonbinding mechanism geared toward resolving trade
and investment disputes.6 9 The future Free Trade Agreement will
not only be modeled after this agreement but will also be based on
the effects of this pact. In fact, the Framework Agreement has
been instrumental in forging the integration of the economies of
the two nations.70
The Statement of Principles of the Agreement contains cer-
tain provisions that underlie the fundamental spirit of the two
65. Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States Concerning a Framework of Principles and Pro-
cedures for Consultations Regarding Trade and Investment Relations, Nov. 6, 1987, U.S.-
Mex., 27 I.L.M. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Understanding].
66. Abelardo L. Valdez, A Proposal for Establishing a United States-Mexico Co-Pro-
duction Zone, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 619, 650 (1987). See Statement of Intent to Nego-
tiate a Framework of Principles and Procedures Regarding the Trade and Investment Rela-
tions Between the United Mexican States and the United States of America (Apr. 23, 1985)
[hereinafter Statement of Intent] reprinted in Field Hearings Before Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1987) [hereinafter Field Hearings].
67. For a comprehensive discussion of the various meetings that took place, ultimately
resulting in the signing of the Framework Agreement, see Valdez, supra note 66, at 650.
68. See Smith, supra note 7, at 657 ("Culminating more than two years of negotiations,
the then-United States Trade Representative, Clayton Yeutter, and Mexico's then-Secretary
of Commerce and Industrial Development, Hector Hernandez Cervantes, signed the U.S.-
Mexico Framework Agreement on November 6, 1987.").
69. See Larry Rohter, North American Trade Bloc? Mexico Rejects Such an Idea, N.Y.
Tmzs, Nov. 24, 1988, at D1, D14; Joint Statement By U.S. Trade Representative Brock and
Mexican Commerce Secretary Hernandez on Bilateral Trade, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.,
Press Release No. 85/4 (Apr. 23. 1985).





1. the need to eliminate non-tariff barriers;
2. the detrimental effects of protectionism;
3. the impact of export earnings on the ability of Mexico to
meet its foreign debt obligations;
4. the role GATT plays in the two countries' trade relationship;
5. the increased significance of services in the Mexican and U.S.
economies with respect to U.S.-Mexican bilateral relations;
6. the importance of adequate protection and enforcement of in-
tellectual property rights;
7. The role of commerce in the development of the U.S.-Mexico
border region.71
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Framework Agree-
ment is the consultative mechanism that it establishes. Allowing
either nation to call for consultations, this mechanism provides a
forum to address any trade and investment concerns that should
arise between the two nations. 72 Timely resolution of major con-
cerns is ensured by an explicit timetable requiring that the consul-
tations begin within thirty days.7 Failure to resolve disputes
grants either nation the right to utilize other settlement avenues,
such as GATT forums.7 4 Successful consultations are further en-
sured through an additional component, which requires the sharing
of information and statistical knowledge with the trade realm."
More vital than the explicit components of the pact is the ability
that the Framework Agreement provides for managing the trading
relationship between Mexico and the United States. By establish-
ing a bilateral forum independent of the political agendas of both
countries, the Framework Agreement ensures that a timely and
complete effort will be made to minimize any and all trade disa-
greement between the two nations. Because it is outside the con-
sultative body of the GATT, this mechanism further benefits the
two nations by narrowing consultations exclusively to issues of
concern to Mexico and the United States.7e This mechanism is es-
71. See Smith, supra note 7, at 658, referring to Understanding, supra note 65, at 439-
40.
72. Understanding, supra note 65, at 440.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 441.
76. See Reflections About the Trade and Investment Relations Between Mexico and
the United States (Aug. i9, 1988) (signed by Ambassador Peter Murphy from the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative and Mexican Undersecretary of Commerce for Foreign Trade
Luis Brova Aguilar) [hereinafter Reflections Paper], cited in Smith, supra note 7, at 671 n.
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pecially important in light of the failure of recent GATT negotia-
tions to produce the multilateral agreements many had expected.
Hence, while the Uruguay Round failed to live up to expecta-
tions-due in part to widespread disputes between the U.S. and
Western European nations in agricultural affairs-the Framework
Agreement allows for direct consultations, obviating many of the
issues that arise in a multilateral setting.
More than any other single document, the Framework Agree-
ment has served to broaden U.S.-Mexican trade relations to a
point where a Free Trade Agreement has become both feasible and
attractive. 8 Given the comprehensive and dramatic changes which
such an agreement would require, integration should be gradually
and cautiously introduced. Only through the benefit of the exper-
iences of the Framework Agreement can the two nations hope to
integrate such dramatically differing economies. The Framework
Agreement will doubtlessly serve as a primary directive in shaping
a Mexican-U.S. free trade agreement. Providing continued and ex-
tensive dialogues, the Framework Agreement will prove to be a vi-
tal impetus in achieving further integration. 9
VII. TRADE POLICY LEADING TOWARDS THE 1989 INVESTMENT
REGULATIONS
In 1989, Mexico had the most active international trade
agenda in its history.80 During the first month of 1989, House Agri-
96.
77. See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, MTN.TNC/W/35/REv. 1, Dec. 3, 1990.
78. See Guy Erb & Joseph Greenwald, An Agenda for Talks on Trade, J. COM., Dec. 16,
1988.
79. Smith, supra note 7, at 681.
80. Mexico foreign trade policy goals included:
1. encourage industrial-technological modernization through protection of intel-
lectual property;
2. take advantage of Mexico's geographic advantages in order to promote effi-
cient integration of export industries, particularly the maquiladora, or in-bond
processing plants;
3. hold frequent meetings between government authorities and exporters to ana-
lyze how the government can better promote export industries;
4. replace tariff restrictions with export permits;
5. increase competitiveness through deregulations of auto transportation, rail-
roads, aviation, telecommunications, insurance, and finance;
6. simplify the administrative process for trade, including a reduction of cus-
toms red tape and an opening of customs offices in the interior of the country;
7. assure sufficient credit for exporters on terms similar to those given exporters
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culture Committee Chairman Kika de la Garza (D-Texas) pressed
the Mexican government to study the feasibility of setting up a
broad U.S.-Mexico trade agreement modeled after the United
States-Canada free trade pact."1 However, Anne H. Houghes, dep-
uty assistant commerce secretary for the Western Hemisphere,
feared attempts at formulating an agreement with Mexico like that
with Canada because the "conditions are not similar. '8 2 Further-
more, Mexico's President, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, planned to ex-
pand the commercial opening developed by the previous
administration."
As early as March of 1989, Commerce Secretary Jaime Serra
Puche was promising new legislation to attract investment under
of countries that compete with Mexico in world markets;
8. seek greater reciprocity from other countries in return for the opening of mar-
kets in Mexico;
9. use bilateral trade agreements to improve access to foreign markets in an ef-
fort to counteract the disruption of international trade caused by the creation of
regional trading blocs;
10. take complete advantage of GATT in order to carry out multilateral negotia-
tions; and
11. because Mexico is a developing country, take better advantage of the genera-
lized systems of preferences.
Government's Development Plan Anticipates Improved Growth, Calls for Trade Initiative,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 739 (June 7, 1989).
81. House Agriculture Committee's De La Garza Presses Mexico to Study Broad
Trade Accord, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 239 (Feb. 22, 1989). For the text of the
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, see Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987,
U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281.
82. Mexico's Pressing Economic Problems Said to Rule Out North American Trade
Pact, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 364 (Mar. 22, 1989) [hereinafter Mexico's Press-
ing Economic Problems]. Houghes stated that conditions concerning tariff barriers are not
similar to those of the Canadian Agreement because Mexico must contend with capital
flight, inflation, and scarce credit for private sector investment before it can formally inte-
grate its economy. Id.
83. Id. For example, the government had made thousands of exceptions to the law's
49% requirement. See Mexican Government Plans New Measures to Attract More Invest-
ment After Slowdown, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 365 (Mar. 22, 1989) [hereinafter
Mexican Government Plans]. Strategic sectors, including petroleum, are reserved under
constitutional law to the government, while maquiladora, or in-bond plants, may be 100%
foreign-owned under the law. Id.
By August 14, 1989, Mexico's petrochemical industry further opened its opportunities
to foreign investment. See Mexican Government Eases Restrictions on Investment in Pet-
rochemicals Sector, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1069 (Aug. 16, 1989). The Mexican
government reduced the number of basic petrochemicals excluded from private investment
from thirty-four to twenty. Id. In addition, "[floreign investors [were] allowed up to 40 per-
cent investment in 66 different secondary petrochemicals such as polyethylene, and up to
100 percent investment in 300 to 400 others considered tertiary." Id. Up to this point in
time, all .foreign investment in Mexico's petrochemical industry had been in joint ventures
which included Dupont, Union Carbide, and Shell. Id.
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Mexico's 1973 Foreign Investment Law.8 4 Additionally, Deputy
Commerce Secretary Herminio Blanco added that companion re-
forms to restrictive patents and intellectual property laws were
also forthcoming."
In the area of long-term planning, Mexico's Communications
and Transport Ministry negotiated with a French consortium, led
by the National Bank of Paris, to build an international bridge
linking the northern part of Mexico with Texas."6 In addition, the
Mexican government was slowly opening itself up to foreign capi-
tal.8 7 The Communications Ministry announced that non-Mexican
firms would be able to set up cellular telephone operations in the
country.88
By May of 1989, the Mexican government had amassed suffi-
cient information on international trade to begin their push to-
wards a more liberalized investment environment. The newly an-
nounced foreign investment regulations allowed automatic
approval of investments of up to 100 percent business ownership in
two-thirds of the Mexican economy in many formerly restricted ar-
eas.' But the new regulations require foreign investors to meet six
84. Mexican Government Plans, supra note 83, at 365. Speaking before the Interna-
tional Business Center of New England in Boston, Mexican Attorney Juan M. Steta, after
meeting with Secretary of Commerce and Development Serra, stated that the future of
Mexican foreign investment policy is based in the realization that "modernization of the
country's economy cannot be financed by the government. . . and therefore must rely on
the private sector." Id. at 366. Therefore, the Mexican government had to open to the pri-
vate sector a number of industries, previously handled by the government, including the
subway, highway, petrochemical, and telecommunications industries. Id.
85. Id. at 365. Blanco stated that Mexico "ha[s] an obligation to modernize investment
and we are ready to negotiate points of divergence" with potential investors on patents and
intellectual property. Id.
86. Id.
87. See Mexico's Government to Cede Control over Telephone Company, Officials Say,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 707 (May 31, 1989). By the end of May, Claudio X.
Gonzales, President Salinas' adviser on foreign investment, announced that the Mexican
Government planned to give up its controlling interest in the state-run telephone company,
known as Telmex. Id.
See also State-Run Telephone Company to Go Private with Foreign Investment Lim-
ited to 23 Percent, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1198 (Sept. 20, 1989). On September
18, 1989, President Salinas announced that Telefonos de Mexico would privatize the com-
pany with foreign investors to own no more than 23%. Id.
88. See Mexican Government Plans, supra note 83, at 365.
89. See Changes in Law Said to Fall Short of Reform Needed to Attract Major For-
eign Investors, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 630 (May 17, 1989). Under the new
regulations, foreigners were allowed to establish twenty-year ownership trusts in those sec-
tors, which otherwise require Mexican ownership. Id. at 630. The new regulations also pro-
mote foreign investment in the stock market through the establishment of trust funds with
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conditions in order to have 100 percent ownership in any project
without special government approval.90 Notwithstanding its liberal
tenor, the new regulations did not open the financial services sec-
tor to foreign investment because Mexico preferred to wait until
the service sector negotiations with the GATT were completed.9 '
Mexico's international market expansion policy was also furthered
by the debt settlement agreements, held in July 1989.92 In August,
the United States-Mexico Binational Commission met in Mexico
City to address issues concerning intellectual property rights, steel,
and textile trades.9 3 The meeting concluded with the signing of
several agreements, " including a formal agreement to build a new
"neutral shares," shares that do not carry voting rights. Id. In addition, they centralize, but
do not change, the rules for the maquiladora, or in-bond processing plants, where 100%
ownership was already allowed. Id.
The regulations, however, were short of what Mexican economists were expecting. Id. at
629. In fact, major investment did not significantly increase over previous levels. Id. Al-
though the Mexican Foreign Investment Law of 1973, which limited foreign investment to
49%, gave the Foreign Investment Commission authority to allow 100% ownership provided
that the investment was judged beneficial to the country, foreign investors complained that
the approval process was extremely bureaucratic and time consuming. Id.
90. Id. The six conditions are as follows: First, the maximum investment must be $100
million; second, direct external funding must come through subscriptions of capital, external
credit, or foreign funds intermediated by Mexican financial institutions; third, investments
must be located outside Mexico's three major industrial cities-Mexico City, Monterrey,
and Guadalajara; fourth, the accumulated foreign exchange flows must be in balance over
the first three years of operations; fifth, the investment must create permanent jobs and
establish training and personnel development programs for workers; and sixth, technologies
used must satisfy existing environmental requirements. Id. Investments that do not meet
any one of the above requirements may still be allowed, but they will have to go before the
National Foreign Investment Commission. Id.
The regulations, even though they permit foreigners to invest up to 100% on a tempo-
rary basis, officially reserve certain fields, such as national air transportation, auto parts
manufacturing, and fishing cooperatives, to ownership by Mexican citizens. Id. at 629-30.
91. Id. at 630. The cumulative value of foreign direct investment in Mexico through
1988 was $24.08 billion, and the number of foreign companies with investments is 8,420. Id.
At the time, the U.S. was the leading investor, accounting for 62.1% by value, followed by
United Kingdom at 7.3%, West Germany at 6.6%, and Japan at 5.5%. Id.
92. See Analysts Predict Markets for U.S. Exports Will Expand Following Bank Debt
Agreements, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 992 (July 26, 1989). The settlement pro-
vided that commercial banks holding $53 billion of Mexico's $107 billion foreign debt agreed
to reduce either the principal by 35% or interest payments by 40%, to 6.25%. Id. The set-
tlement cut the government's foreign obligations by an estimated $19 billion, depending on
which options the commercial banks holding Mexican currency chose to exercise. Id.
93. See Steel Trade, Intellectual Property Rights Top Agenda Items for U.S.-Mexico
Discussions, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 1045 (Aug. 9, 1989). The fifty-two member
U.S. delegation included Secretary of State James Baker, Treasury Secretary Nicholas
Brady, Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, Secretary
of Commerce Robert A. Mosbacher, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, and Environ-
mental Protection Agency Administrator William K. Reilly. Id. at 1046.
94. Secretary of State Baker and Mexican Foreign Minister Fernando Solana signed a
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international bridge between Texas and the Mexican state of Chi-
huahua.95 Two months later, President Salinas visited the White
House where he and President Bush signed three agreements on
trade, investments, and tourism.9e They also signed three environ-
mental agreements, including one pledging cooperative efforts to
fight pollution in Mexico City. 7 By mandating negotiations for ex-
panding trade and investment, the trade and investment agree-
ments went beyond the consultations provided in the United
States-Mexico Framework Agreement. They gave Mexico, for all
practical purposes, preferential treatment by providing for both
tariff and non-tariff barriers to be removed on a most-favored-na-
tions basis.98 The Action Plan accompanying the Understanding
points out the products that were designated for negotiations."
number of agreements covering: environmental clean-up of the Colorado River, recognition
of the 100 year-old U.S.-Mexican International Boundary and Water Commission, maritime
search and rescue cooperation, consular cooperation involving immigration matters, and ex-
emption of taxes on international shipping and transportation. Id. at 1046.
95. Id. (Officials of the U.S.-Mexican Binational Commission also signed agreements
that could improve U.S. Mexican trade on the Texas border. They agreed to replace an old,
narrow bridge from Zaragoza, Mexico, to Ysleta, near El Paso, Texas, with a new interna-
tional bridge to better serve industrial parks in the area. Additional Texas-Mexico border
points of entry will be completed soon at Dolores-Colombia, Los Indios-Lucio Blanco,
Brownsville-Matamoros, Laredo-Nuevo Laredo, Eagle Pass-Peidras Negras, and Los Eba-
nos-Diaz Ordaz).
96. See U.S.-Mexico Understanding Sets Up Process for Negotiating Expanded
Trade, Investment, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1290 (Oct. 11, 1989). The agree-
ment on trade, meant to create a mechanism for future trade negotiations, calls on both
sides to establish working groups whose purpose would be to determine the best ways to
resolve problems and negotiate solutions. Id. The investment agreement establishes a Joint
Committee for Investment and Trade, which meets bi-annually to review the status of joint
trade and promotion. Id. The Committee addresses and promotes investment opportunities,
facilitates coordination of trade and investment events, and cooperates in assembling statis-
tical information related to investment flows. Id. Finally, the third agreement is designed to
expand tourism by simplifying and streamlining procedural and documentary requirements,
opening border crossing points, encouraging binational cultural events, and maintaining ac-
curate statistics on bilateral tourism. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1290-91.
99. $ee id. The designation on product areas would concentrate "on problems that arise
from the time a product leaves the factory or farm until it reaches the ultimate consumer."
Id. These products included motor vehicles, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, telecommuni-
cations, computers, electronics, and food processing. The "interrelated issues" would include
tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade, investment, intellectual property rights, technology, ser-
vices, marketing, restraints, distribution problems, and trade remedy actions. Id.
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VIII. THE 1989 FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGULATIONS
As indicated above, in 1989, President Carlos Salinas intro-
duced a variety of regulations amending the Law on Foreign In-
vestment. 100 These new regulations were a major shift in policyo1
and constituted an unprecedented effort to encourage foreign in-
vestment in Mexico.102 The new Foreign Investment Law is not a
vehicle for granting incentives such as tax breaks or cost reduc-
tions in energy or land.103 Rather, the benefits granted to foreign
investors basically lie in deregulation.104 That is, the new regula-
tion grants the foreign investor the right to establish a 100 percent
foreign owned enterprise in Mexico without first obtaining prior
approval from the National Foreign Investment Commission, pro-
vided certain conditions are met.105 The new regulation attempts
100. For the text of the 1989 regulations, see Reglamento de Ia Ley parr Promover la
Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, D.O., May 16, 1989 [hereinafter 1989
Reg.].
The Mexican President's authority to issue regulations is well recognized in Mexico's
constitutional history, doctrine, and court decisions. See G6mez-Palacio, supra note 15, at
258 and sources cited therein.
101. Mexico faced three major problems. First, Mexico was unable to increase its ex-
ports; for example, total exports constituted $20,929 million in 1982, compared with US
$20,656 in 1987 and $20,657 in 1988. See 197 INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTAWfSTICA, GE-
OGRAFIA E INFORMATICA, CUADERNO DE INFORMACI6N OPORTUNA, Aug. 1987, at 82. Second, for-
eign investment decreased. For example, during Mexico's oil-booming economy, direct for-
eign investment increased over 17% per year, which amounted to $2.3 and $2.5 billion
dollars in 1980 and 1981, respectively; but from 1982 to 1983, the figures dropped to $1.6
billion to $0.4 billion. See 21 REviSTA EXPANSI6N No. 519, July 5, 1989, at 40. Third, Mexico
had an ongoing problem of capital flight. Mexican-held bank deposits in the United States
totaled roughly $13.1 billion in 1987, according to the Federal Reserve Board. This figure is
only a part of overall capital flight, since a substantial portion is invested in real estate,
securities, and other unregistered assets. See ROBERT A. PASTOR & JORGE G. CASTANEDA,
LIMITS TO FRIENDSHIP: THE UNIrED STATES AND MExIco 255-56 (1988).
102. The Mexican Constitution contains no provision for the promotion of foreign in-
vestment, nor does it favor foreigners. See MEX. CONST. art. 32, which provides that under
equal circumstances, Mexicans will be preferred versus foreigners, for all kinds of conces-
sions and for all jobs, appointments, and government commissions.
103. See G6mez-Palacio, supra note 15, at 259.
104. Id. Article 5 of the 1989 Regulation provides that "foreign investors may partici-
pate in any proportion in the capital stock of a corporation,. . . and will not require...
the authorization of the Ministry." See 1989 Reg., supra note 100, at 14-15.
105. G6mez-Palacio, supra note 15, at 259. First, investments in fixed assets which are
made during the preparatory stage should not exceed an amount determined by the Minis-
try of Commerce. Second, financial resources for such investments must come from abroad.
Third, the minimum amount of paid capital stock must equal 20% of the total investment
in pre-operational fixed assets. Fourth, companies should locate facilities for manufacturing
or industrial operations in zones other than those with great industrial concentration. Fifth,
companies must keep their accrued balance of foreign currency at least at a break-even
point during the first three years of operations. Sixth, corporations must use appropriate
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to entice foreign investors through three vital ends: simplification
of administrative demands, heightened stability in the Mexican le-
gal infrastructure, and less onerous limitations on direct
investment.10e
While the new Article five enhances foreign investment oppor-
tunities and eliminates the approval requirement, it squarely con-
tradicts that same article of the 1973 Foreign Investment Law,
which requires the promotion and protection of Mexican invest-
ment.1 07 Nonetheless, by initiating these important changes 08 in
Mexican regulations, the Executive branch of the Mexican govern-
ment is hoping to facilitate foreign investment into a country that
desperately needs such capital flows.
These new regulations have helped enhance not only the cli-
mate for foreign investment but also the climate for a comprehen-
sive Free Trade Pact between the U.S. and Mexico.109 As the eco-
nomic ties increase through heightened U.S. investment in Mexico,
and vice versa, the viability and desirability of such an agreement
becomes increasingly obvious.
technologies and comply with legal provisions on environmental protection. See Ogarrio and
Castro, supra note 11, at 230.
106. See generally Rodolpho Sandoval, Legal Issues with Respect to Free Trade Be-
tween United States and Mexico, 19 INr'L J. LEGAL INFO. 91 (1991).
107. For a discussion of how the two articles are contradictory, see G6mez-Palacio,
supra note 15, at 260 n. 32. Hope Camp, Counsel to the Ad Hoc Group on Mexican Intellec-
tual Property, told the House Ways & Means Committee that changes to existing laws
should come in the form of amendments to existing statutes rather than by regulations,
because such regulations are inferior to statutes in Mexico's legal hierarchy. See Witnesses
at the ITC Predict Impact from Recent Trade Liberalization Measures, 6 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 48, at 1604 (Dec. 6, 1989); see also G6mez-Palacio, supra note 15, at 262 ("be-
cause the [1973 FIL] and other laws were approved and enacted by the legislature, they are
superior to the [1898 Reg.]. Therefore, the [1989 Reg.]'s provisions which contradict the
[1973 FIL] and other laws enacted by Congress appear to be technically illegal and
unconstitutional.").
108. See Mexico's Commitment to Opening Its Markets Seen in Joint Ventures Be-
tween Apparel Firms, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1637 (Dec. 13, 1989). Enrique
Ponce de Leon, trade commissioner of the Mexican Trade Office in Dallas stated that "other
changes paving the way for the agreement include a reduction in Mexico's tariffs to a mini-
mum of 10 percent and a maximum of 20 percent and the elimination of a need for import
licenses for 87 percent of the items on Mexico's tariff schedule."
109. But see C. Michael Aho, More Bilateral Trade Agreements Would Be a Blunder:
What the New President Should Do, 22 CoRNEL INT'L L.J. 25, 25-26 (1989) (stating that a
free trade agreement would undercut the GATT process and harm individual nations' long-
term interests).
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IX. RECENT "FAST-TRACK" AUTHORITY
An important drama unfolded during the first quarter of 1991
concerning the proposed Free Trade Agreement between Mexico
and the United States.' This involved the balance of power"' be-
tween the Executive branch of Government and Congress concern-
ing the issue of "fast-track.""11 2 This section will briefly detail on
the history of fast track, its operation, the objections towards it,
and the results of the fight over it between President Bush and
Congress."'
110. See Bush Free-Trade Plan Causes Capitol Unrest, ExPREss-Nws, Mar. 13, 1991,
at 7B; Bush Sells Mexico Trade Pact on Hill, WASH. TnMEs, Mar. 20, 1991, at C12; Bush
pide el Apoyo de los Lideres Hispanos de E.U. para el TTLC, LA PRENSA, Mar. 22, 1991, at
1; S.A. Delegation to Meet with Bush, ExPREss-NEws, Mar. 12, 1991, at 2C; S.A. Firm Will
Market Free-Trade Agreement, ExPREss-Nws, Mar. 20, 1991, at 7B; White House Letter
from Shiree Sanchez, Associate Director, Office of Public Liaison, inviting the author of this
paper to a White House briefing by President Bush, Mr. Michael Boskin, Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, Robert Mosbascher, Secretary of the Department of Com-
merce, and Ambassador Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative (Mar. 11, 1991).
111. See Mark A. Phariss, FTA Fast-Track Authority at Risk, Mxx. TRADE LETrER,
Apr. 30, 1991, at 1, stating that:
Congressional opposition to the FTA is now growing, and it is no longer certain
that Congress will extend "fast-track" authority to the FTA by the June 1st
deadline. Failure by Congress to grant fast-track authority to the FTA-a proce-
dure by which Congress agrees to forego its right to amend the negotiated
FTA-would most likely kill the FTA negotiations. Either chamber of Congress
can defeat fast-track authority by a simple majority vote.
See also 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 391 (Mar. 13, 1991) (Representative Sander M.
Levin states that the fast-track procedure, which requires Congress to approve or reject
trade agreements without amendment, shifts the "balance of power" from Congress to the
administration.).
112. See generally Forward to President Bush's Report to Congress on the Extension
of Fast-Track Procedures for Trade Negotiation Legislation, Along with 1991 Trade Policy
Agenda, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 368 (Mar. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Forward]. Fast-
track procedures are located in the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act, 19 U.S.C. §§
2902-04 (1988); see also Sen. Bensten, Others on Finance Committee Back Extension of
'Fast-Track' Authority, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 421 (Mar. 20, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Sen. Bensten] ("[the fast track procedure] requires Congress to approve or reject any
negotiated trade agreement without amendment. It will be automatically extended until
May 31, 1993, unless the House or the Senate adopts a resolution of disapproval by June
1.").
113. See Phariss, supra note 111, at 1.
Serious concern over Congressional opposition first became public on March 7th
of this year. On that day, two influential members of Congress and supporters of
fast-track authority--Senator Lloyd Bensten, Chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, and Representative Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee-wrote President Bush to inform him that fast-
track authority for the FTA "will not be easy."
Id. The loss of congressional support for the FTA began with opposition by organized labor.
The AFL/CIO, UAW, and other labor unions have expressed fears that a free trade agree-
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During the early part of this century, Congress and the Execu-
tive recognized that the negotiation and implementation of trade
agreements require special cooperation between the two
branches.1 " Following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act"' of 1930 and
the subsequent Depression,116 both Congress and the President re-
alized that only by working closely together in the exercise of their
constitutional responsibilities could the two branches effectively
bring down foreign barriers to United States trade and open op-
portunities for U.S. products and services in the international
marketplace.
1 7
The new arrangement was manifested in the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934,118 which gave the President authority to
not only conclude tariff-cutting agreements, 119 but also imple-
mented them by proclamation without the need for subsequent
legislation.120 During the following years, when the principal barri-
ers to trade were tariffs, this arrangement proved highly successful
and was responsible for the tariff reductions that promoted post-
World War II economic growth.1 21 As countries began to rely less
on tariff protection and more on non-tariff trade barriers, the
scope of trade negotiations broadened, and the fast-track proce-
dures were created by Congress as the necessary complement to
this broader trade agenda.
Congress's inclusion of fast track procedures in trade legisla-
tion is not a recent phenomenon. 2 2 While giving Congress the as-
ment with Mexico will result in lower wages, reduced benefits, and a loss of jobs for Ameri-
can manufacturing workers. These fears are based on the belief that manufacturing compa-
nies will move their operations to Mexico to take advantage of the substantial wage
difference between American and Mexican labor. Id.
114. See 137 Cong. Rec. E1953 (daily ed. May 29, 1991) (statement of Rep. Lee H.
Hamilton)("Trade agreements are difficult to handle under our system of government. The
President's negotiators commit the U.S. in an agreement to change its laws, but only Con-
gress can enact those changes. U.S. negotiators have found foreign governments reluctant to
negotiate because the possibility of congressional amendments gives the U.S. a second
chance to obtain concessions"); see also Forward, supra note 112; White House Briefing;
supra note 110.
115. Tariff of 1930, 46 Stat. 590 (1930).
116. For a recent interpretation of the Great Depression, see JOHN K. GALBRArrH, THE
GRzAT CRASH 1929 (1988).
117. Forward, supra note 112, at 368.
118. Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, 48 Stat. 943 (1934).
119. Id. § 350(a)(1).
120. Id. § 350(a)(2).
121. Forward, supra note 112, at 368.
122. See The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2101 (1974); The Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1979).
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surance of meaningful participation throughout the negotiating
process,"'3 fast track also provides certain guarantees essential to
the successful negotiation of trade agreements,"s namely, a vote on
implementing legislation within a fixed period of time" 5 and a
promise of no congressional amendments to the legislation after
the negotiations are complete between the Executive and the nego-
tiating country.12 6
These procedures reflect an understanding between the Execu-
tive and Congress that trade agreements, in which results in one
area are often linked to results in others, are particularly vulnera-
ble to multiple amendments following the negotiations. Such
amendments could unravel the entire negotiated agreements. 2 ,
Through the fast track, Congress gives the President the same
bargaining power possessed by his counterparts: the ability to as-
sure his negotiating partners that the agreement reached interna-
tionally would be the agreement voted on at home. 28 Without fast
track, the President cannot give Mexico that assurance. Without
that assurance, Mexico will be reluctant to negotiate with the
United States and, therefore, will not make the concessions neces-
sary to reach an agreement with the United States. Understanda-
bly, no foreign government will be willing to reveal its bottom line
in the negotiations knowing that the bargain could be re-opened by
Congress at a later date. 129
On the basis of the established fast track procedures, the
United States has negotiated and implemented three trade agree-
ments, each of which an overwhelming majority approved: both
rounds of GATT negotiations 30 the Free-Trade Agreement with
Israel,'5s and the Free Trade Agreement with Canada.1 3 2
123. Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act, supra note 112, at § 2902 (d).
124. Forward, supra note 112, at 368.
125. Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act, supra note 112, at § 2903 (a)(1)(A).
126. Id. § 2903(b).
127. U.S. Trade Representative, Carla Hills, has stated that with fast track, other coun-
tries will not be willing to come to the negotiation table, noting that any agreement reached
without fast-track could be subject to change. See President Bush Set to Ask Congress to
Extend 'Fast-Track' Authority as GATT Talks Resume, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at
296 (Feb. 27, 1991).
128. Rep. Dorgan Introduces Resolution Opposing President's Bid for Fast-Track Ex-
tension, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 342 (Mar. 6, 1991).
129. Id.
130. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 122, at § 2503(a), (c).




A. The Fast-Track Process
The fast track procedures preserve Congress's role during the
negotiation, approval, and implementation of trade agreements."' 8
To ensure congressional and private sector input, the fast track
statute contains extensive notification and consultation require-
ments. 134 In fact, Congress is involved in each step of the negotia-
tions process, from initiations through implementation.
To use the fast track for any agreement, bilateral or multilat-
eral, the President must notify Congress ninety calendar days
before signature.13 5 By the time the President gives his ninety-day
notification, private sector advisory committees must report their
views on the agreement to both Congress and the President. For
bilateral agreements, Congress must be given advance notice of the
negotiations."3 ' During the following sixty legislative working days,
either the Senate Finance or House Ways & Means Committee can
vote to deny fast track treatment.
1 37
Once an agreement is reached, Congress and the Administra-
tion work in close consultation to formulate the implementing leg-
islation. The process involves the full participation of all commit-
tees on jurisdiction, not only those committees traditionally
consulted in setting trade negotiation objectives. If the agreement
and its implementing legislation are still not acceptable, they can
be rejected by a majority vote of either house. 3 '
By incorporating fast track into the 1988 Act, Congress ex-
pressly contemplated that an extension of the provision beyond
June, 1991, might be necessary and appropriate in order for the
President to effectively pursue the U.S. trade policy objectives set
out in the Act.'39
132. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 102
Stat. 1851 (1988).
133. Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act, supra note 112, § 2902(d).
134. See, e.g., Id. §§ 2903(a)(1)(A), (B), and (a)(2).
135. Id. § 2903(a)(1)(A).
136. Id. § 2902(c)(3)(C)(i).
137. Id. §§ 2903(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(5)(b).
138. Id.
139. The negotiation period was to be extended to May 31, 1993 unless the House or
the Senate were to adopt a resolution of disapproval by June 1, 1991. Id. § 2903(b)(1)(B)(i),
(ii). Indeed, the Senate did adopt such a resolution on May 24, 1991. See infra note 145 and
accompanying text.
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B. Fast Track Objections and Hurdles
The objections over fast track are basically objections over the
proposed Free Trade Agreement.4 0 That is, the opponents of the
Agreement reasoned that if they were successful in obstructing
fast-track, they would essentially be able to defeat the
Agreement.14
140. Organized labor mounted a strong campaign to persuade Congress to block an ex-
tension, arguing that the proposed U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement will cost U.S. work-
ers up to 1.5 million jobs. See President Bush Urges U.S. Business Leaders to Press Con-
gress to Support 'Fast-Track', 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 522 (Apr. 10, 1991); see
also LaFalce Opposes Fast-Track Authority for U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 8 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 203 (Feb. 6, 1991) (in which Representative John LaFalce
stated "I fear that a hastily concluded trade agreement could have immediate adverse con-
sequences for American Industry and labor without producing significant long-term recipro-
cal trade benefits for the U.S. economy"); Public Interest Groups Continue to Oppose Fast-
Track Extension for FTA Negotiations, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 580 (Apr. 17,
1991) (Environmental and other public interest groups also campaigned against extension of
the fast-track authority, claiming that environmental concerns would not be addressed ade-
quately if fast-track was used.).
141. Sen. Bensten, supra note 112, at 422 (At a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee
hearing on the U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, Senator Jesse Helms charged the Ad-
ministrations' request for fast-track extension is tantamount to asking Congress to approve
trade agreements before they are negotiated). He claimed that the negotiators devised a
'secret plan' to sacrifice the U.S. textile, auto, and steel industries in multilateral trade ne-
gotiations. Id. According to Representative Byron L. Dorgan, "the Constitution gives Con-
gress alone the right and responsibility to regulate foreign Commerce. Fast-track treatment
represents an abdication of this constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce." See
Sen. Holings Introduces Resolution to Kill 'Fast-Track' Trade Procedure, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 423 (Mar. 20, 1991).
In a memorandum to President Bush, Congressman Richard Gephardt, House Majority
Leader, outlined some of his concerns and objections:
ESCAPE CLAUSE:. . . it is important that a comprehensive escape clause
provision be included as part of the negotiation framework that can act as a
stop-gap measure to stem the loss of jobs and business opportunities if there is a
hemorrhaging in any one sector.
RULES OF ORIGIN: .. we must not allow Mexico to become an export
platform for the products of third countries to flood our markets.. . . We must
have a very strict rule of origin standard regarding production in Mexico.
TRANSITION:. . . transition relief measures should be examined that will
allow companies adversely affected by [the FTA] to receive government help in
finding new markets for their products and converting to new lines of business.
WAGE DISPARITY: . . . the question [is] how we address the substantial
wage and standard of living disparity that exists between our two countries. Our
goal must be to raise the wages and standard of living of Mexicans, not lower our
own.
ENVIRONMENT: I would ask that environmental issues be included on
the negotiating agenda.
WORKERS RIGHTS: Among the provisions an [FTA] should include are
respect for freedom of association; respect for the right to organize and bargain
collectively; prohibition of the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor...
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On March 1, 1991, President Bush asked the Congress for an
extension of the fast-track which would otherwise expire on June
1, 1991.141 Four days later, Representative Byron L. Dorgan intro-
duced a resolution which, if approved by the House, would deny
President Bush's request for a two-year extension. is On May 1, as
a result of a request from Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, and Senator Lloyd Bentsen,
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the President submit-
ted a seventy page "action plan"' 44 to Congress.
On May 24, 1991, after the dust had settled and the votes were
counted, the Senate voted to extend fast-track authority for an-
other two years.146 By a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-six, the Senate
rejected a resolution, introduced by Senator Ernest Hollings, that
would have denied President Bush's request for a two-year exten-
sion. 46 The day before, the House had also endorsed fast-track
procedures by voting 231-192 to reject a resolution offered by Rep-
establishment of a minimum age for the employment of children; acceptable
conditions with respect to wages and hours of work.
LABOR MOBILITY: ... I am very concerned about the prospect of sub-
stantial numbers of Mexican workers entering the U.S. labor market, even if
only on a temporary basis. [Procedures must be set up to address these issues.]
HUMAN RIGHTS: We must also use the [FTA] negotiations as a means of
support for the Salinas government to make further efforts to curb human rights
abuses.
Letter from Congressman Richard Gephardt, House Majority Leader, to President Bush
(Mar. 27, 1991).
142. See Sen. Bentsen, supra note 112, at 421. President Bush, in requesting the fast-
track extension said that the administration would use the procedure to negotiate the
GATT and North American trade agreements, as well as to fulfill the trade objective of the
administrations; so-called Enterprise for the Americas Initiative involving countries in Latin
America. Congress had until June 1, 1991 to stop the process, or the fast-track authority
would be automatically extended for two additional years to May 31, 1993. See Fast-Track
Process for Trade Agreement Threatens Environmental Laws, Groups Warn, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 698 (May 8, 1991). Prior to Bush's March 1 request, some proponents
of the fast-track who had previously met with the Secretary of Commerce of Mexico, Mr.
Serra Puche, and had presented position papers to the Mexico City Mexican Chamber of
Commerce, were invited to the White House by the President for a Free Trade Agreement
and Fast Track briefing. See Rudy Sandoval, Mexican Americans Voice Stake-Holders In-
terest on the FTA in Mexico, LA PRENSA, Feb. 22, 1991, at 2; Sen. Bensten, supra note 112,
at 423.
143. See Rep. Dorgan, supra, note 128, at 342. Co-sponsoring the resolution were Reps.
Jim Jontz, Mary Russo, Lawrence J. Smith, Barney Frank, Pat Williams, David R. Obey,
and Vic Fazio.
144. See Selected White House Documents Released May 1, 1991, on Negotiations of
North America Free Trade Agreement, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at 713 (May 8, 1991).
145. See Senate and House Vote to Extend Fast-Track for North American FTA,
Uruguay Round Talks, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 802 (May 29, 1991).
146. Id.
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resentative Byron Dorgan that would have disapproved Bush's re-
quest for an extension of fast-track procedure. 1 7 With such fast-
track authority in place, a successful free trade agreement appears
likely to emerge.
X. CONCLUSION
No discussion of the proposed Free Trade Agreement between
the U.S. and Mexico can begin without a sound understanding of
the recent dramatic developments that have occurred in the trad-
ing relationship between Mexico and the U.S. An analysis of the
comprehensive alterations in Mexico's foreign trade policy pro-
vides a more complete grasp of the environment in which future
integration will occur. Such a grasp requires a thorough examina-
tion of the body of law which will serve as a foundation for the
proposed Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. These precedents
help elucidate not only the impetus for a free trade pact but also
the model for such a pact. Thus, the foundation has been laid for a
successful Free Trade Agreement.
Mexico has broken with the past and has embraced the future
not only in theory and policy, but also in practice. Old protection-
ist infrastructures in Mexico continue to crumble and fade into
history while new ideas emerge to reach across the legal boundaries
of two countries and two neighbors that have been strangers to
each other for over one hundred years. It is a perfect match. Mex-
ico, with its rich minerals and labor resources, and the United
States with its advanced technologies and capital resources can
bring about one of the most dramatic economic activities in their
history.
But the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement will not
be easy, for there are still many obstacles, including the difference
in social, political, economic, and judicial systems. These dilemmas
will eventually be resolved, for those who will make the potential
opportunities become reality are still emerging from the ranks of
the international business and legal community.
147. Id.
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